In the past two decades, Chile has implemented three reform strategies that shaped its educational decentralization process, each motivated by different goals. In the 1980's, during the military regime, an economic model structured a voucher system that created incentives for parents to choose schools for their children. In theory, bad schools would improve in quality or go out of business. The second reform began in 1990 and was embedded in the transition from autocratic to democratic government. Sociologists were the intellectual authors of this initiative which focused on improving the working conditions of teachers. In 1994, the third strategy began with educational researchers focusing attention on the classroom effectiveness and the need for better instructional materials and improvements in the teaching/learning process. The continued study of educational decentralization in Chile is important because it represents the only nation in the world with a nation-wide voucher system.
-2-complemented with privatization of higher education. In addition, it was an answer to the subjective feeling that public spending on education is often inefficient. Previous governments had been able to provide access to education for students reaching the school-entrance-age, but the quality was still to be improved (Cox, 1999; Winkler and Rounds, 1996) . Since the design and implementation of the Chile decentralization process (at least in its first stage) occurred in a setting that did not permit political opposition, they are unlikely to be easily replicated in other countries (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 373 ).
The decentralization of schools was supposed to help the government to reduce the political pressure of a National Teachers' Union that opposed the government. Thus, salary contracts with teachers would be negotiated in each one of 327 Municipalities rather than in one high stakes national collective bargaining process as in the past. At the same time, the government expected that schools would compete for students (public choice); that economic incentives would help in selecting the best teachers, given that their quality can be known only at the local level; and that the best schools would be rewarded by parents selecting the best schools that their children could attend (market choice).
Therefore, it was assumed that market competition would improve efficiency and even generate some additional local financing. As a long-term result the quality of education would improve. In short, the government would be creating incentives to select the best teachers at the municipality (county) level, to attend as many students as possible, and also provide incentives for parents to select the best schools. Possible losses from decentralization were not discussed (Carnoy, 1998, p. 310 ).
On the other hand, fee-paid universities would reduce the amount of public funding for higher education. Transferring resources from higher education to preschool and primary education would improve the equity of public funding and extend the benefit of post-secondary education to a larger -3-share of the population (González, 1999) . Furthermore, the economic bonanza of 1980-81 encouraged people to obtain better training in a market demanding qualified workers (Schiefelbein, 1991, p. 20) .
The second reform strategy began in 1990 as part of the political platform of the newly elected democratic government that replaced the autocratic government of General Augusto Pinochet.
Sociologists were the intellectual authors of this second initiative and it focused on teacher motivation, curriculum design, and remedial programs. Quality improvements in [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] had been poor; there was still an unequal distribution of learning results; little social mobility for the poor or reduction of poverty was in evidence; and the private sector was demanding a better-trained labor force. But the main demand was linked to the lack of benefits for teachers. After a quick evaluation of the process, a decision to support the decentralization process was made, but the new government "reversed the deregulation of the teaching labor market" (Cox, 1999, p. 35) . The so-called Teachers Law (Estatuto Docente) established centralized bargaining, a common structure of wages, and made it practically impossible to lay off teachers.
The third reform strategy began in 1994, following the election of the second democratic government, and was based on a comprehensive research program carried out by the UNESCO Regional Office for Education. Achievement was still low in comparison to developed countries, and most workers below the median salary in the labor force were unable to communicate in writing or learn from their job manuals. Chilean employers believed that functionally-illiterate workers constrained their possibility to compete in a global market (ECLA-UNESCO, 1992; Apec, 1999) . This third strategy focused on the classroom level (including teaching methods, materials and learning processes) and an efficient allocation of teachers. In 1995 it was agreed to adjust the teaching body to students enrollments and to link teachers' wages to the amount of time worked and in 1996 the -4-students' daily scheduled increased from five to seven hours.
Framework of the Reforms.
The education decentralization strategy was part of a larger reform of public administration that was intended to respond to a free-market global economy. "Reaganomics" and "Thatcherism" were shaping the economics of the 1980s. In a small country like Chile, some 150 "Chicago Boys" led a government elite staff to share the vision of a free market economy and a firm decision to constrain direct service provisions by the State (Schiefelbein, 1991, p. 20) . Two internationally known University of Chicago professors, Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger, provided continuous support for that vision.
The educational decentralization reform was lead by the powerful Ministry of Government that appointed the mayors in each of the 327 counties. Given the tight social control exercised during the military regime, changes went unchallenged. In 1979, in an interview with a national newspaper, I questioned apparent inconsistencies in the teacher training policies. The next day it was published as the first criticism of the educational policies of the military regime. The following days I felt worried about possible consequences of my questioning of official policies.
The 1990 strategy was embedded in the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic government and the demands made by political parties and unions (Social Debt). The strategy was also influenced by world events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the UNESCO led Major Project on Education for the region, and the World Conference on Education for All (Cox, 1999, p. 30 (Tedesco et al, 1994) . The Mission included ten internationally known educational reform practitioners (Schiefelbein, 1997; 1996) . Their endorsement was instrumental in the construction of the national consensus on proposed reforms reached later on in the National Commission and the unanimous support in Congress to approve the extension of the daily school schedule in 1996.
Design.
The first strategy directly tie school revenues to school enrollments. In 1981, central government school attendance grants (or vouchers) were extended to finance public and private primary-secondary education. The municipalities and private school-owners received grants based on the number of students attending class each month (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 366) . Grants were adjusted for education level, day or night shift, and location, with rural and boarding schools receiving more. In addition, private schools were eligible to receive government-financed textbooks and school lunches for poor children, but they were not eligible for capital investment grants. The implementation took advantage of a tradition of public subsidies to private schools offering free education; historically most of such school had a religious affiliation. A 1951 law provided a per student subsidy equal to 50% of the cost of public education (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 366) .
At the same time the government transferred to mayors all decisions on personnel -6-employment and management of the public school system, including allocation of new schools and grants for school construction and rehabilitation. Most of the schools were transferred to municipalities, but some 50 vocational secondary schools were also transferred (with a special lump sum subsidy that could be twice as large the value of the voucher) to associations of employers and business corporations or to their non-profit educational organizations (Cox, 1999; Schiefelbein, 1991) . However, key functions remained centralized: financing of schools; curriculum development; national testing (evaluation); school lunches to poor children; and distribution of textbooks. Also curricula designed by single schools was approved and eventually some 200 different curricula programs were in operation.
The government also liberalized the entrance of new private schools. Private schools had to decide whether to charge tuition or to use the vouchers, determined by the same formula used to determine municipal school grants. Therefore, public education would compete for students at an equal level with private education (market choice). Parents would decide which type of school they would select (public choice). Teachers could receive different levels of salaries, according to their demonstrated ability or students' achievement. As a by-product, teachers' salaries were expected to evolve towards the market levels. Eventually, the government expected that the private subsidized sector would increase their coverage and that the average quality of each school would be raised.
At the outset, it was accepted that private education would be difficult to deliver at the 3000 rural schools (one third of the total), or in urban-marginal areas, because existing schools would be natural monopolies and the margin of profit would be small or negative.
The original design was changed several times in 1981-1990 without a careful evaluation of previous educational outcomes (Schiefelbein, 1991, p. 23) . The size of the subsidies was gradually -7-reduced with the heavy contraction of the economic activity in the early eighties. By 1990, the real value of the grant had decreased by almost 40% (Winkler and Rounds, 1996 , p. 366). In 1981 -1984 , the transfer of schools was made by agreement with the interested municipalities in exchange for some extra cash transfers. Eventually, transfers were imposed on the municipalities in order to finalize the process in 1986.
The first democratic government elected in 1990 implemented a revised strategy after an internal debate. The educators wanted to keep the decision making process closer to the community.
Those more politically oriented or supporters of the Estado Docente defended a centralization process. Eventually, the platform of the democratic candidate supported the decentralization, but promised bringing about participatory opportunities for teachers and parents as well as a National Salary Agreement for teachers. As part of the decentralization process in public administration, in 1990 a law was enacted that required the election of all mayors. The opposition supported this law because previously each new government had the power to appoint all mayors.
As soon as the new democratic government took power, a project was prepared and negotiated with the World Bank to develop primary education. The project did not include an analysis of the impact generated by the decentralization process. The World Bank assumed that projects prepared at the school level would raise the performance, even though "we know very little about the effects of choice on learning" (Patrinos and Ariasingam, 1997, p. 4) . However, the selection of projects was made by staff appointed by the Ministry and, therefore, once again the role of the Ministry of Education was broadened.
The 1994 strategy focused on making the country aware of the education problems and possible solutions. Newspapers and TV stations broadcasted the inability of 40% of 4 th grade -8-students to understand simple written messages. The main issue was to find feasible ways to help the decentralized system to improve education, given that the market alone was unable to do it.
Experimental schools showed that solutions based on materials that helped students to be actively involved in sound learning experiences could solve that problem. The message was that teacher centered instruction (frontal learning) should be blended with active learning. In addition, the gap in terms of available time for learning was reduced; bidding on textbook procurement eventually included half a dozen required criteria linked with active learning; the World Bank project was revised to make sure that all schools would have computers to access Internet, and a data bank of descriptions of the best learning experiences was developed by the best teachers of the country.
Curricula was further decentralized in 1996-98. The new curricula included a core of topics covering some 60% of the learning time. Though most local schools used the curricula suggested by the Ministry, each school principal was able to determine the curricula to be used in the remaining 40% of the available learning time. As mentioned above, the daily schedule increased in 40%, and two weeks were added to the length of the school year.
Educational needs and tensions.
There were three major sources of tensions in the 1981 decentralization process: (i) the gaps between expected and real education achievement levels; (ii) the politico-ideological differences between a military regime and a leftist teachers' union; and (iii) the disregard for efficient strategies to improve the quality of teaching.
The expected improvement in the quality and functioning of the educational system derived from market choice, public choice, local bargaining, and a national testing system did not -9-materialize. Frontal teaching and lack of learning materials had constrained students achievement, mainly in schools operating in population areas below the average socioeconomic level. These constraints probably explain why 40% of fourth grade students were constantly unable to understand the main message of a short article on the first page of the national newspaper. This poor performance was far below the expected increments in quality necessary to generate private educational initiatives.
The military government's reduction of the power of the teachers'union resulted in declining salaries, a pattern seen in other countries (Cox, 199, p. 25: Hanson, 1997, p. 9) . The military government feared a teacher's union with most members devotedly attached to left or centerleft positions. Nearly 10% of the teaching staff with politically leftist militant tendencies were expelled in 1974-80, and the training of new teachers was transferred to universities. However, in spite of being a military regime, the government felt that teachers had the backing of the silent majority of the population. The regime forgot that low salaries attract people from the lower half of the socio-economic distribution which is usually closer to leftist political positions.
In sum, by the end of 1993 the government had improved the conditions of education because it had: (i) raised teachers' salaries; (ii) started an educational computer network (ENLACES) that reached some 300 schools in 1993; (iii) provided books, classroom libraries, and materials; (iv) granted some US$10,000 to each of approximately 2,000 education improvement projects (PME) designed at the school level and selected at the provincial level; (v) provided positive discrimination to 900 low-achieving schools; and (vii) extended preschool through centralized public agencies.
The 1994 strategy focused on the daily problems of teachers compelled to generate successful -10-learning experiences in each class. This approach was endorsed by a national consensus reached by the Presidential Commission on Education which was representative of all parties concerned.
At the outset, the issues were widely discussed in the mass media, such as the low national average achievement levels in reading and writing of children from families below the average socioeconomic level. The new strategy was based on massive research carried out over the past decade by the UNESCO Regional Office for Education. This research identified a massive failure in reading and pointed to proven successful classroom strategies that could cope with such an enormous problem of student achievement. Four necessary changes of classroom activities were identified, and the Teachers Law was amended which permitted the municipalities to re-allocate teachers according to school enrollments
Still there is poor management of public schools. Even though world experts recommend that the best teacher should be teaching the first grade (Schiefelbein and Wolff, 1998) , most new teachers are assigned to first grade. Thus, children do not achieve a good command of basic skills.
Also the amount of time teachers spend in the classroom is less than the official time they should work, mainly in the case of rural or urban marginal teachers. In isolated areas or schools without telephones its not easy to monitor whether or not teachers spend the required amount of time in the classroom.
Organizational Culture of the Educational Institution
The 1981 strategy changed the traditional pattern by arranging for teachers salaries to be determined by market demand, even if the salaries were too low to attract good future teachers. In addition, eight other cultural variables (or myths) were reflected in the decentralization strategies -11-of both 1981 and 1990. They were: (i) the expectation that each teacher should generate interesting learning experiences from scratch; (ii) textbooks could be designed to provide bits of knowledge that teachers can use in certain moments of the learning experiences they design; (iii) the amount of time available for learning is enough; (iv) the expectation that each school could act alone to design its own curricula along with implementing the best teaching strategies available; (v) the expectation that teachers have extra-class time to provide formative evaluation; (vi) students should be able to work alone towards their personal development, competing with their classmates;
(vii) the locus of control of the learning process is external to the students, thus the students learn because there is a teacher; and (viii) parents are marginal to the main activities of the school. On the other hand, the 1994 strategy emphasized the need to change all these eight cultural variables.
In Chile, teacher salaries are relatively low with respect to other jobs requiring four years of university training. In addition, it is difficult to change such a pattern when teacher training institutions have to educate students that mainly select the teaching career because there were no other alternatives open for them. Therefore, principals have to screen from among applicants that graduated in the lower quartile during their secondary education. The pool of talent is sharply limited, and most of the new teachers are not going to get salary increases. Therefore, there is a vicious circle that will keep average salaries low and consequently prevent the educational system from hiring the best qualified high school graduates of each generation. Thus, the 1990 and 1994 reform strategies emphasized the need to raise salaries so that better candidate would be attracted to the teaching profession. Attracting more qualified teachers became a requisite for improving the operation of market systems in education.
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The 1981 and 1990 decentralization reform strategies assumed that each teacher should use all her/his knowledge and experience to design each class as rewarding experiences that facilitates students in maximizing the learning experience. Unfortunately, no attempt was made to help teachers gain access to well described and detailed lesson plans written by other teachers, that could be adapted to classrooms around the country. In the Chilean educational culture each teacher was expected to start preparing lesson plans from scratch. This culture of work is contrary to other creative fields, such as in music (where master piece scores are always available); in medicine (where surgery manuals describe in detail all the steps of each operation); or in drama or ballet (where the scripts of each play are readily available to recreate the production). The assumption that each school works in isolation is reflected even in the lack of mechanisms for principals and teachers to visit the best and/or worst schools, or to create opportunities for establishing mutual visits and discussions. In fact, rural schools have no advice whatsoever to improve their teaching methods.
No changes were proposed in 1981 and 1990 for textbooks, even though they usually do not conform to the main characteristics of a good learning process. For example, textbooks: (i) do not suggest activities that students should carry out to grasp the main concepts; (ii) contain no instructions for effective group work; (iii) present no options for the student to make decisions about how to engage in the learning experience; (iv) give few instructions for writing conclusions or reporting the work carried out; (v) do not include activities to be carried out with the family; and (vi) provide limited opportunity in the book for students to self-evaluate their work. Acceptance of traditional books constrained the teachers' ability to change the predominant frontal teaching method used during their training, including the period in the pre-service teacher training institution.
-13-Adding to the textbook problem, there was a gap between the total number of hours per year available for teaching/learning in Chile as compared with the total number available in developed countries. In Chile, the school year included some 160 effective schools days, and a daily schedule of five hours. In developed countries the school year included 180 to 200 school days, and six to seven hours of daily schedule. Therefore, students in Chile had one-third less time in their classrooms than students in most developed countries.
The process of student evaluation also contributed to problems associated with the profession. Because many teachers are accustomed to evaluating students' work at home, they try
to minimize the amount of extra work devoted to evaluation. Tests emphasize spelling and grammar, isolated from the use of language for communication, because it takes less time to grade those tests.
In rural and urban marginal schools, the average primary student does not write more than six pages of compositions or free writing in the whole school year. It takes longer to evaluate a composition or free writing than to grade a test in spelling or grammar. In any case, there is little formative evaluation that helps students to improve their future performance. Most of the time, it is summative evaluation that meets the evaluation requirement of the grades to be reported.
Parents are usually invited to attend two or three class meetings to receive reports on their children, but their interest is not used as an element of the learning process. There is no evidence that students have to talk with their parents to carry out some of their homework, nor to bring information available at home to be processed in the classroom. In the early grades there is no attempt to use family knowledge of riddles, stories, songs, recipes, ancestors, or history of the community.
The 1994 strategy introduced numerous initiatives to improve the quality of education. For -14-example, ENLACES was planned as a mechanism for sharing the best lesson plans and for easy retrieval of past experiences. Unfortunately the designers of the network eventually omitted this mechanism in their design. Beginning in 1995, average achievement scores were published to serve as a comparative clearinghouse process. A national contest for the best lesson plans was carried out in 1994 and 1995 with support from UNICEF and UNESCO and later on a system of national prizes for the best teachers was implemented.
With all these materials and cases available, most schools should be able to prepare their own curriculum. Textbook design started to change through a bidding process that included technical specifications and other relevant criteria. The need to increase the available school time was eventually agreed to in 1996. Also, the 1994 reform made communication the center of the language curriculum and reduced other aspects to complement this ability. Finally, the 1994 strategy questioned the singular use of frontal teaching and suggested the need to complement it with many other alternative models. It took advantage of the successful experience of Escuela Nueva (Colombia) and its work with parents (Schiefelbein, 1992) .
In summary, the 1994 strategy questioned the main characteristics of the traditional organizational culture and proposed systematic changes. They were highlighted and supported by the Interagency Mission in early 1994 (Tedesco et al., 1994) and later on by the National Presidential Commission for Education.
Since 1990, efforts have been made to encourage community and parent participation.
However, the lack of a tradition of participation and the lack of opportunities for a real cooperation between teachers and parents to improve the performance of the students, have limited the progress towards better quality of education. Municipalities are financing ten percent of their school budgets -15-with their own sources (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 366) . The large size of this financial activity has attracted vested interests of political bosses and kinship (padrinos). Some teachers are hired according to their political partisanship or family ties. In any case, there are no objective indicators of teachers'performance, therefore, evaluation of teachers at the municipal level is not based on objective information.
Outcomes
The three strategies have generated both positive and negative outcomes. The seven main positive outcomes of the decentralization process are: expansion of private education and total enrollments, more school-days attended by students, participation of business associations, efficient pay-back of vouchers, a well administered testing system, a larger share of public resources allocated to primary education, and streamlining the former bureaucracy. The negative side includes five key issues: reduced teacher salaries, the inability to encourage community and parent participation, reduced amount of resources for education, areas in which no public-choice is available, and the dumping of poor students into the public schools. In addition, little can be said about changes in efficiency, quality or level of achievement, pre-service teacher training, and the role of parents.
There was an impressive expansion of private education and total enrollments in the 1980-90 period. Private urban schools increased from 2,000 to 3,000 in that period, but few operated in rural areas. Subsidized private schools raised their share of primary-secondary enrollments from 16% to 32% in that decade. (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 367; Cox, 199, p. 26) . By 1994, 57% were in municipal schools. Increased flexibility through deregulation was the key for this expansion (Carnoy, -16-1998, p. 317) .
The linkage of school revenues to students daily attendance also increased the total number of school-days attended by students. However, as in El Salvador, longer attendance did not raised the achievement level. The increase in pupil achievement in that country only occurred in the early 1990s after "increased spending per pupil and technical assistance to low-income schools" (Carnoy, 1998, p. 318) .
Technical secondary education managed by private industry is graduating students that are in demand by the labor market. Available fragmentary evidence suggests that results are good, even though the unit cost is sometimes twice as much as the cost of municipal technical secondary schools (Cox, 1999, p. 25) . On the other hand, several institutional advantages were used in implementing the reforms. For example, management capacity is adequate and the level of public corruption is low.
As a result, an efficient pay back of vouchers has operated including effectively penalizing schools for inaccurate reporting of student attendance (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 373) . The use of standardized government accounting has helped the monitoring of expenses and budgeting.
Past experience and management ability were also the basis for the design and operation of a well administered testing system (Cox, 1999, p. 26; Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 373) . Since 1995, testing information has been widely published in newspapers.
It should also be highlighted that the former Ministry bureaucracy was streamlined. The staff of the Ministry of Education was drastically reduced from 30,000 to 3,000. Professional personnel necessary to produce technical guidelines, and supervisors essential to following up their implementation, were retained in the new structure. The Ministry of Education then monitored schools through 13 regional offices (SEREMIS) and 40 provincial education units (Schiefelbein, 
1991, p. 22).
The negative side includes reduced teacher salaries as a source of continuous struggle. The reduction of teacher power resulted in declining salaries, as has happened in other countries. In 1981 teachers were terminated as central government employees, given severance pay and transferred to municipal payrolls (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 366) . The union lost its collective power and a conflict remained latent until democracy was re-established in 1990. Also, a new Teachers Law finally improved the salary and conditions of job stability.
"Intermunicipal variations in fiscal capacity generated inequities in per pupil school expenditures" because municipalities provided a small supplement to the school attendance grants they received (Carnoy, 1998, p. 318) . However, "the relatively large size of the central government school attendance grant (almost 90% of total financing) ensures all pupils receive a relatively high minimum level of school services" (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 373) .
Not all students can choose the school they attend. In one-third of the total of 327 municipalities there are no subsidized private schools and only one-fifth have paid private schools.
Furthermore, private schools are concentrated in urban areas. In 91 predominantly rural municipalities, students have no choice but to attend public schools (Carnoy, 1998, p. 317) .
Subsidized private schools used to charge illegal fees in various forms (Carnoy, 1998, p. 327) . A law was enacted in the early 1990s to allow all schools to charge fees not exceeding 50% of the voucher. This law may compound problems mentioned in the following paragraph. It may be necessary to find ways to assure equality of access to opportunities for good education.
Despite the legal prohibition of student selection in any voucher school, private subsidized and recently municipal schools tend to select the better pupils. Most of the low achieving pupils must -18-be accepted by the public system, but recently students with lower-than-average grades must enroll in private subsidized schools. The advantage of more homogeneous groups was estimated to be six percentage points, after controlling for average socioeconomic background of students (Carnoy, 1998, p. 320 ).
There are changes not easily amenable to be classified as positive or negative. For example, there was a decrease in total real spending on education during the 1980s (Carnoy, 1998, p. 317; Cox, 1999, p. 23) , and a recovery in the 1990s. On the other hand, a larger share of public resources was allocated to primary education in the 1980-90 period. At the same time, public spending in higher education decreased from 38% in 1980 38% in to 19% in 1990 38% in (Cox, 1999 ).
Little can be said about the impact of these outcomes or the level of achievement. There are no differences in the value added by private and public schools (Mizala and Romaguera, 1998; Carnoy, 1998) . While "subsidized private schools appear to be more cost-effective than municipal schools" given their lower unit costs, the differences disappear when profits "captured by the owner/director of the school" are included (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 368, 373) .
Pupil performance measured by achievement tests remained constant in the 1980s (Prawda, 1993, p. 259) or fell for the bulk of students in public schools (Carnoy, 1998, p. 320) . Measured in terms of scores of the private students from high socioeconomic levels, there has been a reduction in the gap with respect to students in public schools.
There is too little time to evaluate the effect of the national consensus reached by the Presidential commission on education. However, one aspect can be singled out: for the first time in a quarter century, government and opposition representatives enacted by consensus a law that extended the daily teaching schedule from five to seven hours.
-19-
Final comments
We have learned about active (or lack of) reactions of an educational system to incentives.
The introduction of the voucher program led to a large number of schools changing status from paidprivate to subsidized-private. Later on, reductions in the real value of the voucher led to paid-private schools regaining their earlier market share (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 373) . On the other hand, management capacity and sound financial accounting in the original public system have also been important in implementing the decentralization reform.
Sharing of the successful learning experiences designed by individual (or groups of) teachers may be an effective way to accumulate educational knowledge. The approval of special curricula could feed a data bank of programs of study that schools could use to select the learning activities that best fits their specific needs.
We are now aware that achievement scores of students in public schools should not be compared with those in subsidized-private schools, because "private schools have a continuing advantage in terms of student background characteristics" (Winkler and Rounds, 1996, p. 373) .
The evidence from these decentralization processes can help educators and economists to design and/or determine realistic proposals for regulating competition among public and private education, who should pay for schooling, in which cases part of the cost should be borne by taxpayers rather than by direct beneficiaries, and which could be the type of vouchers used to transfer subsidies. In any case, the educational decentralization experiment in Chile is extremely interesting and worthy of study as it continues into the 21 st century.
